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Abstract—Recent work has shown the impact of adversarial
machine learning on deep neural networks (DNNs) developed for
Radio Frequency Machine Learning (RFML) applications. While
these attacks have been shown to be successful in disrupting the
performance of an eavesdropper, they fail to fully support the
primary goal of successful intended communication. To remedy
this, a communications-aware attack framework was recently
developed that allows for a more effective balance between the
opposing goals of evasion and intended communication through
the novel use of a DNN to intelligently create the adversarial
communication signal. Given the near ubiquitous usage of for-
ward error correction (FEC) coding in the majority of deployed
systems to correct errors that arise, incorporating FEC in this
framework is a natural extension of this prior work and will
allow for improved performance in more adverse environments.
This work therefore provides contributions to the framework
through improved loss functions and design considerations to
incorporate inherent knowledge of the usage of FEC codes within
the transmitted signal. Performance analysis shows that FEC
coding improves the communications aware adversarial attack
even if no explicit knowledge of the coding scheme is assumed and
allows for improved performance over the prior art in balancing
the opposing goals of evasion and intended communications.
Index Terms—radio frequency machine learning, adversarial
machine learning, forward error correction, cognitive radios
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning has been shown to be a transformative tech-
nology for providing substantial improvements in modalities
such as image recognition, natural language processing, text-
to-speech, among many others. Given this fact, in recent
years a significant research push has been occurring in ap-
plying deep neural networks (DNNs) to wireless communi-
cation applications. In particular, the research area of Radio
Frequency Machine Learning (RFML) has seen exponential
growth. RFML is typically defined as utilizing DNNs in
order to solve complex wireless communication problems of
interest using raw, or preprocessed, IQ sample data as input.
Recent research has shown that RFML has led to improved
capabilities over traditional solutions in areas such as spectrum
sensing, modulation scheme creation, emitter identification,
and automatic modulation classification (AMC) [1]–[3].
Given this explosion in systems using DNNs, much scrutiny
has been directed at the security of these learning-enabled
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systems, a study which is generally termed as adversarial ML.
More specifically, the class of adversarial ML attacks known
as evasion attacks have been shown to be particularly potent
in emphasizing the inherent vulnerabilities of RFML solutions
(see [4]–[8], among others). Put simply, evasion attacks are
approaches by which the input data is manipulated with intel-
ligently crafted perturbations in order to lower the confidence
of a target DNN’s outputs, induce incorrect classifications, or
even target those classification decisions at a specific label of
choice by the attacker [9]–[11].
Traditional evasion attacks typically assume that these intel-
ligently crafted perturbations are created and applied directly
at the input to the DNN. However, for most real-world
applications, this assumption of direct access to the DNN is
impractical. Therefore, for RFML applications, there are two
key considerations that must be considered. First, the evasion
attack must be resilient to the propagation channel between the
signal transmitter and the DNN. Secondly, and perhaps most
importantly, is the fact that the perturbations must minimize
their impact on the intended receiver. While the previous works
have considered the first goal in detail, there has been little
work to date on consideration of the second goal. To remedy
this, the authors’ prior work developed a communications-
aware framework that provides a mechanism for balancing
the conflicting goals of successful communication and DNN
evasion [12].
This work extends the communications-aware evasion at-
tack framework through the consideration of forward error
correction (FEC) coding. Due to the usage of FEC coding
in the vast majority of real-world communication systems to
correct errors that arise due to hardware impairments, channel
propagation effects, etc., incorporating FEC in this framework
is a natural extension of this prior work and is shown to
improve performance in more adverse environments. More
specifically, this work shows that the intelligently crafted
perturbations inherently learn to utilize the nature of the coding
to limit the negative impacts of altering the original signal
while having a negligible impact on the attack’s performance
on the target DNN. In other words, this work shows that
this intelligent perturbation can be learned without providing
explicit knowledge of the FEC in the perturbation creation
process. While the communications-aware framework is dis-
cussed herein in the context of AMC, it can be generalized
for other RFML applications of interest.
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Fig. 1: The wireless communications scenario considered within this work in which an intended communications link is being
eavesdropped. The ”perturb” block of the transmitter utilizes the developed communications aware attack framework to perturb
the transmitted signal to evade the eavesdropper.
This paper is broken down as follows. Section II provides
a description of the overall system model and environment
assumed in this attack. Section III lays out the framework for
the communication-aware attack that utilizes FEC. The results
of this work and an analysis of the transmitter’s ability to craft
smarter perturbations with FEC is shown in Section IV. Finally,
this work concludes with a discussion of the key findings of
this research as well as directions for future work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Figure 1 depicts the wireless communications scenario
for this work which consists of three main components: a
transmitter, an intended receiver, and an eavesdropper.
A. Transmitter
The transmitter has two competing goals within this sce-
nario: to successfully communicate with a naive receiver, and
to evade modulation classification by an AMC-based eaves-
dropper. Here, the two metrics used to evaluate the success
of these goals are, respectively, the bit error rate (BER) at
the receiver and the modulation classification accuracy of the
eavesdropper. Within the communications aware framework,
the transmitter balances between these goals by deploying a
form of adversarial machine learning known as an evasion
attack. In an evasion attack, the signal ingested by the deep
learning algorithm under attack is intelligently perturbed in
order to fool the algorithm. In this work, these perturbations
are produced by a specially trained network called an Adver-
sarial Mutation Network (AMN). This is represented by the
”Perturb” block in Figure 1 and is described in Section III.
Here, the transmitted data is assumed to be modulated using
a linear digital-amplitude phase modulation scheme (ASK,
PSK, QAM, etc.) and is pulse shaped using a root-raised
cosine filter. Unlike the previous work, the data is assumed to
be encoded using an FEC code in order to add redundancy
for correcting errors induced by the propagation channel
and/or due to the evasion attack’s perturbations themselves. In
particular, block codes are assumed within this work. Block
codes are first assumed in this work as they allow for a more
recognizable pattern of redundancy during encoding, given that
they encode blocks of bits independently, which the AMN
should be well suited to learn without explicit knowledge of
the code. As an initial step, learning without explicit infor-
mation of the coding is desirable so that the communications
aware attack framework can easily be executed on different
coding types without needing to change the architecture of
the AMN, or attack framework, which is useful in modern
automatic modulation and coding approaches.
In order to guarantee that the eavesdropper’s performance is
not impacted by the FEC code itself, the transmitter also uses
data whitening after FEC coding to whiten the bits and create
a more uniform distribution of bits during transmission. More
specifically, this is done in order to guarantee that the eaves-
dropper is only impacted by the ability of the communications
aware framework to create intelligent perturbations signals
rather than the inherent difference between FEC-enabled and
non FEC-enabled signal structures. This work uses an IBM
implementation from [13].
B. Receiver
Simply put, the role of the receiver is to successfully receive
the transmitted data. In this work, the receiver is assumed to
be static and unaware of the perturbations being applied at the
transmitter. This models a scenario in which the transmitter is
adaptable to changes in the environment (such as the presence
of an eavesdropper) but the receiver is a legacy system that
cannot be easily adapted on the fly. Additionally, for ease of
analysis and preliminary performance analysis, it is assumed
that the receiver and transmitter are synchronized (e.g. through
the use of a header and/or control channel).
C. Eavesdropper
The eavesdropper utilizes a state-of-the-art RFML approach
to perform modulation classification using the raw IQ data
sent by the transmitter. The eavesdropper is assumed to have
limited knowledge of the transmitted signal and therefore
must detect, isolate, pre-process the raw data prior to mod-
ulation classification. This work focuses on disrupting the
classification stage of this processing chain. More specifically,
in this work it is assumed that the eavesdropper uses a
convolutional neural network (CNN), like that presented in
[1], to perform modulation classification. The eavesdropper’s
CNN was trained using synthetic signal data created using
In Review
LiquidDSP [14] with SNRs ranging from 0-20 dB five modu-
lation schemes (described in the following). Like the receiver,
the eavesdropper is assumed to have no knowledge of the
communications aware framework and therefore does not react
to the attack.
D. Data and Environmental Assumptions
In this work, without loss of generality, the modulation
schemes considered are BPSK, QPSK, 8-PSK, 16-QAM,
and 64-QAM. For each of these modulation schemes, the
communications aware attack framework is trained and its
performance is evaluated. The propagation channel between
the transmitter and both the receiver and eavesdropper is
assumed to be modeled by an AWGN channel. For both
training and testing the framework, the SNRs at the receiver
and eavesdropper are assumed to be uniformly distributed
between 5 and 15 dB. The SNRs and noise realizations
between the transmitter and receiver and the transmitter and
eavesdropper are assumed to be independent from one another.
Additionally, an integer sample time offset is introduced as
a channel effect for the eavesdropper in order to assume
asynchronous operation with the transmitter. This time offset
is assumed to be uniformly distributed between 0 and 8 (the
assumed number of samples per symbol). Prior work has
shown that time offsets larger than the samples per symbol
have little effect on the success of the adversarial attack [4].
III. COMMUNICATION AWARE FRAMEWORK
This section presents the methodology used to carry out
a communications aware attack that utilizes FEC to deceive
an eavesdropper while maintaining effective communication
between the transmitter and receiver. A description of the
nature of the AMN that is used to create the perturbed signal
is provided first in this section. Then the custom loss functions
used in this work to balance the goals of communication and
evasion are discussed. Finally, an overall explanation of the
training and testing procedure is presented.
A. Adversarial Mutation Network
In previous work, various gradient-based approaches have
been used to generate perturbations of the original transmitted
signal to achieve the goal of classification evasion [9], [15].
While effective, these techniques typically focus on the success
of the evasion at the detriment to the communication link
between transmitter and receiver. This process involves per-
turbing a signal using a loss gradient that is back-propagated
through the classifier network to create an adversarial signal.
This may have to be done multiple times per signal block
and must be done separately for every signal block trans-
mitted, creating a very computationally-exhaustive process in
a wireless transmitter that it typically resource constrained.
Alternatively, networks known as Adversarial Transformation
Networks (ATN) make use of a separate neural network to gen-
erate the perturbation automatically [16]. These networks can
utilize custom loss functions in order to balance the adverse
effect that perturbations have on communication. Additionally,
while the training process of a network requires a large number
of computations, once trained it only requires one forward pass
of a signal through the network in order to create a perturbed
signal to be transmitted, which is much more computationally
efficient than solutions relying on gradient-based optimization.
The work presented in [16] provides two examples of such a
network: Adversarial Auto-Encoders (AAE) and Perturbation-
Adversarial Transformation Networks (P-ATN). While based
on similar concepts, the output of these two networks are
different. An AAE is provided an input signal and outputs
the adversarial signal to be sent over the air. This signal is a
learned combination of the original signal plus a perturbation
and is represented by the equation
x∗ = g(θ, x) (1)
where g(·) denotes the AAE, θ represents the parameters of the
network learned during training, and x is the original signal. A
P-ATN is given the same input signal as the AAE but instead
outputs a perturbation that is then added to the original signal
for transmission. The following equation shows this process.
x∗ = x+ g(θ, x) (2)
In summary, the AAE crafts the complete signal while the
P-ATN creates a perturbation to be added to a signal.
Previous work in this area used a P-ATN to accomplish
the goals of the transmitter [12] but this work shifts to the
use of an AAE. While P-ATN implementations have simpler
convergences (a P-ATN would only need to output 0 in order
to transmit a signal optimal for communication while an AAE
would need to learn to pass the original signal through the
network unchanged), these introduce a different problem. The
scaling of the perturbation with respect to the original signal
must be done outside of the network. The P-ATN doesn’t
explicitly learn this scaling process. An AAE inherently learns
to balance the power of the perturbation and original signal
since it outputs the combined signal and therefore simplifies
the process. Scaling is important because if the perturbation
was significantly powerful, the transmitter would have an
unfair advantage over the eavesdropper. Additionally, most
communications are limited in the power that they can trans-
mit. For this reason, this work imposes a power limit on the
AMN. The current work will utilize an AAE and refer to this
as an Adversarial Mutation Network (AMN) throughout the
paper. The architecture of this network consists of a three
convolutional layers with tanh activation functions in between
these layers. The AMN takes in a single-channel complex
input of size [1, 1, 2, N] for a signal with N samples and
outputs a signal of the same size and dimensions.
B. Loss Functions
The AMN utilizes custom loss functions during training in
order to achieve its goal of deceiving the classification abilities
of the eavesdropper while simultaneously limiting the BER
at the receiver. This communications-aware attack improves
the ability of previous evasion attacks that only focused on
misclassification. Due to the dueling nature of the transmitter’s
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Fig. 2: The communications aware attack framework training process. Three loss functions (power loss, communications loss,
and adversarial loss) are utilized by the AMN during the training process to intelligently craft the signal perturbations for the
given spectral environment.
focuses of communication and evasion, multiple loss functions
must be used that are then balanced. The total loss function
is shown below.
Ltotal = αLadv + βLcomm + γLpwr (3)
The current work uses three loss sub-functions: adversarial
loss, communications loss, and power loss denoted as Ladv,
Lcomm, and Lpwr respectively. The adversarial loss seeks to
minimize the eavesdropper’s ability to successfully classify the
signal, the communications loss looks to minimize the BER
impact at the receiver, and the power loss seeks to minimize
the power of the perturbation, thus keeping the adversarial
signal similar to the original signal. These losses are summed
together to provide an overall loss metric for the training
process. In order to balance the effects of each of these loss
terms, balancing constants are set for each of the losses.
This helps set the desired tradeoff between communication
success and classification evasion. The three constants, α for
Ladv, β for Lcomm, and γ for Lpwr, are varied with respect
to each other and sum to 1. As α grows, the transmitter
becomes more focused on evasion and the resulting signal
tends towards noise. As β increases, communication improves
at the detriment of the evasion ability. As γ grows, the signal
instead converges to the original, unperturbed signal.
Each of the separate loss functions are constructed so that
they converge to 0 when achieving their desired effect, as
is typical of other loss functions used to train DNNs. The
optimization technique Adam, which utilizes gradients of the
loss, is used during training which therefore requires the loss
functions be differentiable [17].
1) Adversarial Loss: Adversarial loss looks to maximize
the ability of the AMN to evade classification by the eaves-
dropper. In this sense, the intent of the adversarial loss metric
mirrors that of a loss that would be used in more traditional
evasion techniques such as FGSM. The metric used is the
confidence the eavesdropper network has that the received
signal is the original source modulation, determined by a
softmax output. A decrease in this confidence can lead to a
successful untargeted attack when the source class is no longer
the one determined as most probable by the classifier. The loss
function used is rooted in log-likelihood and approaches 0 as
the confidence decreases but tends toward∞ as the confidence
increases. The adversarial loss is defined as
Ladv = −log(1− ps) (4)
where ps represents the confidence of the original source
modulation scheme and is obtained as the result of a softmax
activation layer at the output of the eavesdropper’s AMC
network. This work only evaluates untargeted attacks but could
easily be used to implement a targeted attack using −log(pt).
2) Communication Loss: The intent of the attack presented
in this work is to carry out an attack that evades classification
by a malicious eavesdropper while simultaneously allowing for
effective communication between a transmitter and receiver.
While the adversarial loss metric described above helps ac-
complish the former, it has a negative impact on the latter. As
the AMN has increased success at fooling the eavesdropper,
this typically means that the transmitted signal is very different
from the original and therefore the communication reliability
will degrade. The communication loss is included to guide
the AMN to find a balance between adversarial success and
communication success.
One way to quantify the reliability of communication is
with BER. In the system model used in this work, the bits are
retrieved by making a hard decision on the received symbols.
Unfortunately, this process is not differentiable which means
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a gradient can’t be calculated for the training process. If the
hard decision process was differentiable, this loss could simply
be an MSE between the original and received bits or could
be defined by a gradient formula as shown in [6]. In order
to circumvent this issue, the communication loss utilizes two
components, BER and error vector magnitude (EVM) of the
symbols. The loss is defined as
Lcomm = br × EVM(Stx, Stx+p) (5)
where br is the BER calculated using the signal received over
the noisy channel after the bits have been decoded with FEC.
Since the encoding used in this work is done at the bit level
instead of encoding the symbols, the error calculations are
also performed on the bits rather than on symbols as was
done in the prior work. The EVM shown in the loss function
represents the distance between the original symbols and the
noiseless symbols after the perturbation is added. The EVM is
calculated as |Stx − Stx+p|. EVM is used in the loss because
it is differentiable; thus the BER serves as a magnitude while
the EVM serves as a direction for the weights to update.
3) Power Loss: The third and final loss component used in
this work is the power loss. The power loss aims to reduce
the power of the perturbation compared to that of the original
signal. The loss is calculated using an altered version of the
signal-to-perturbation ratio (SPR), given as
Lpwr =
1
Es/Ep
=
Ep
Es
(6)
whereEp is the energy of the perturbation and Es is the energy
of the signal. The ratio is switched so that it decreases as the
perturbation energy decreases, mirroring the behavior needed
for the loss function. Additionally, the above equation is done
on a linear scale rather than logarithmic so that the values are
between 0 and ∞ rather than −∞ and ∞. This allows the
loss to converge to 0, providing numerical stability.
C. Training and Testing Process
The training process follows that depicted in Figure 2. The
encoding and whitening of the randomly generated bits occurs
before the modulating, sampling, and shaping processes and
the final transmission process is adversarial signal generation
of the AMN. Before transmission, the adversarial signal is
normalized so that the average symbol power is 1. PyTorch is
used to implement the AMN and training process.
IV. RESULTS
The communications aware attack framework just described
was used to train a variety of AMNs. There are three main
focuses for the results: 1) to determine the difference in com-
munication and evasion capabilities between AMNs trained
with and without FEC, 2) to study the effects of the adaptations
made on the communication aware framework when compared
to prior work, and 3) to understand the impact of changing γ
(power loss constant) and thus varying the power, and therefore
impact, of the perturbation. For ease of analysis, the α (ad-
versarial loss constant) and β (communication loss constant)
values were fixed at 70% and 30% of the remaining 1 − γ
respectively (since the three losses are set to sum to 1). These
values were set such that evasion was prioritized adequately
regardless of the value of γ. Otherwise, the transmitter would
not successfully evade signal classification for larger γ.
A. Intelligent Perturbations with FEC
As shown in prior works, the addition of FEC inherently
improves the intended communication link during an evasion
attack given its inherent ability to correct bit errors. However,
this work aims to show that the developed improvements to
the communications aware attack improve the performance be-
yond the FEC’s capabilities acting alone. To demonstrate this,
Figure 3a shows the results of both the framework considering
FEC during training and the framework when FEC is taken
out of the training process for a γ set to 0.1 (shown with
the solid lines). The modulation scheme and FEC coding are
QPSK and Hamming (7,4) respectively. As can be seen, there
is improved intended communication performance given that
the SNR differences between the BER curves for Hamming
(7,4) and non-coded communication links are further apart
than their respective theory curves in the code’s operating
region. For example, the SNR required to achieve a BER of
10−3 using an AMN trained with FEC has an improvement of
roughly 1.5 - 2 dB over an AMN trained without. To further
emphasize the improved framework’s ability to inherently
leverage the FEC code, this figure also shows the BER curve
when the transmitted signal utilizes a Hamming (7,4) code
but is perturbed using an AMN that was trained without FEC.
In this case, there is still a roughly 25% improvement in
communication performance. These results show that the AMN
has learned how to more intelligently craft the perturbation
when FEC is present in the training process such that it limits
the hit on communications performance.
While Figure 3a shows that there is a noticeable improve-
ment in communications performance, for this case there is
also an increase in the eavesdropper’s classification success.
However, this is a very small improvement compared to the
communication improvement. Additionally, the classification
accuracy of the eavesdropper is equal between the two im-
plementations for approximately half of the SNR range. To
show this trade off further, Figure 3b demonstrates an observed
case where the impact to communications between the AMN
trained with FEC and that without is more equal, as indicated
by the green and red lines being closer together. In other
words, transmitting encoded signals using the AMN trained
with FEC would offer the same BER as transmitting encoded
signals using the AMN trained without FEC. When this occurs,
the accuracy of the eavesdropper decreases when the AMN is
trained with FEC. Therefore, if the desire is to improve the
evasion performance, the transmitter trained with FEC can
decrease the success of the eavesdropper’s AMC if maintaining
the same level of communication reliability as a transmitter
trained without FEC instead of improving the reliability.
Figure 3c shows similar trends for a Hamming (12,8)
applied to a QPSK signal. Given these results, it is shown
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Fig. 3: Intended communications link BER and eavesdropper classification accuracy for different values of SNR (Es/N0) given
a QPSK modulated signal. The baseline theoretical curves of BER are shown given both FEC coding and non-coding as well
as the baseline classification accuracy of the eavesdropper with no perturbation applied. (a) performance when using Hamming
(7,4) and γ values of 0.1 and 0.7. (b) performance for Hamming (7,4) and a γ value of 0.1 when the communication impact
between coding and non-coding is more equal. (c) performance when using Hamming (12,8) and a γ value of 0.1. In each
case the addition of FEC in the training process improved communication with respect to BER with little to no degradation
in the reduction of eavesdropper performance.
that the AMN is able to learn to use the coding without any
architecture changes since it learns the FEC implicitly and
doesn’t rely on knowledge of the specific coding.
As discussed in the previous section, the γ value represents
the weighting of the loss function that controls the power of
the perturbation relative to the signal. To show the impact
of γ, Figure 3a also shows the results when γ is increased
from 0.1 to 0.7 (shown with dotted lines). This higher γ value
means the training process prioritizes the goal of intended
communications over evasion. This effect can be seen in the
figure as improved BER performance at the cost of increased
classification accuracy. The improvement when training using
FEC is most significant when the evasion is prioritized since
the FEC-enabled AMN is more efficient with the limited
communication and power losses.
Figure 4 shows the BER of the intended communications
link and the classification accuracy of the eavesdropper for
a variety of γ values assuming a 16-QAM signal held at a
constant SNR of 12dB. As can be observed, as γ increases,
the perturbation power loss is more prioritized which leads to
the perturbed signal being closer to the original signal. As this
occurs, the BER decreases but the accuracy increases as would
be expected, and as is seen across all modulation schemes and
FEC codes tested, ensuring generality across configurations.
B. Spectral Improvement
The communications aware attack framework developed
in the previous work tended to spread the perturbation out-
of-band of the transmitted signal to reduce impact on the
communications link, given the assumption of oversampling
at the eavesdropper (an intuitive result indicating correct
functionality) [12]. Figure 5a shows the spectrum usage of
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Fig. 4: Intended communications link BER and eavesdropper
classification accuracy given a transmitted 16-QAM signal
with SNR=12dB for different weightings of the power loss
function during the communications aware attack framework’s
training process (represented by γ).
the signal and perturbation for both the current and previous
framework in [12]. As can be seen, this work improves on
the spectral efficiency of the perturbation by moving more of
the perturbations in band and reducing out-of-band emissions.
While there is still perturbation outside the main band, it is
less significant in power and the perturbation more closely
follows the frequency structure of the original signal. These
improvements are due to the framework updates of using an
AAE and the power loss. Figure 5b shows a plot of the signal
in the time domain for the imaginary channel with the original
signal, the signal generated [12], and the signal generated with
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Fig. 5: The (a) spectral shape and (b) time-domain repre-
sentation of a transmitted QPSK signal with and without
perturbation. The improved communications aware framework
developed in this work reduces the out-of-band effects caused
by the perturbation over the prior work.
this work. The signal created using the framework developed
in this work more closely resembles the original signal in
structure. The adversarial signal in previous work is less
smooth due to its high frequency content, especially in the
minima. Additionally, the signal power given this approach is
equal to the original signal while the previous work generates a
signal with about an 8-10% increase in power. Therefore, this
work presents an attack that is both more spectral efficient
and more power efficient than the prior work.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This work has shown that the communications-aware attack
framework, trained with signals utilizing FEC, can inherently
learn to leverage the added data redundancy to generate more
intelligent perturbations that have less impact on the intended
communication link while not impacting evasion performance
against an eavesdropper. To achieve this, modifications to the
framework were developed that allow for improved feedback
through the training loss functions that more directly represent
the impact of FEC on the intended communications link.
Performance analysis shows that for the operating region of
the FEC code, the improved framework developed in this
work was able to better evade the eavesdropper for a given
intended communications link bit-error rate over a system not
utilizing FEC. The results of this work demonstrate that the
improved performance is not just due to the inherent benefits
of using FEC on the communications link, but also due to the
framework intelligently learning to manipulate the transmitted
signal based upon the capabilities of the given FEC code.
In addition to the enhanced attack performance, the im-
proved framework developed in this work provides for per-
turbed signals that better hold their original spectral shape than
what was seen in the prior work [12]. A limitation of the prior
work was the assumption that the eavesdropper oversampled
the received signal allowing out-of-band perturbations effects.
This improved framework therefore allows for both relaxed
eavesdropper assumptions and more efficient bandwidth uti-
lization of the perturbed transmitted signal.
While this work focused on the inherent benefits of using
FEC in the framework, the results herein could be further
improved through utilizing explicit knowledge of the FEC
coding scheme during the training process. More specifically,
targeted updates to the loss functions and AMN architecture
design decisions (such as setting convolution kernel sizes and
stride lengths relative to the FEC code) that correspond to
the specifics of the FEC code used could further enhance
the performance of the framework. Additionally, future work
should work to further improve the spectral characteristics of
the perturbed signal through the incorporation of loss metrics
that aim to keep the transmitted signal within its predefined
spectral mask. This would have the added benefit of improved
performance against eavesdroppers with intelligent filtering
processes aimed at removing out-of-band perturbations. Other
targets for future work include incorporation of knowledge of
the channel propagation effects between the intended receiver
and/or eavesdropper, as was done in [18], as well as the
impacts of non-block code FEC schemes on the framework.
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